# Sense of Insecurity and Limited Democratic Exposure

The creation of the AIML and its struggle for Pakistan were both basically the outcome of a sense of insecurity of privileged Muslims from Muslim minority areas, especially North Indian Muslims.1 That sense of insecurity necessitated a ‗strong man‘ role. While in Muslim majority areas, as mentioned previously, fear of Hindu domination was not an issue, so people here were least affiliated with the North Indian Muslims‘ perception of their project. Moreover, these areas were characterized by factionalized politics by feudal lords and tribal chiefs. Thus, the lack of popularity of the party and the factionalized politics here required subtle but authoritarian management in order to make the movement effective as the common cause of all the Muslims of British India. Therefore the ruling elite, mainly from Muslim minority areas—sensitive to security concerns and cautious to factionalized politics—was the product of an authoritarian structure and culture though it worked in a broader rational-democratic framework.

The ruling elite, being the product of authoritarianism, was not only sensitive to ‗perceived‘ external threats but was also cautious about internal ‗disruptive elements‘. For that reason the elite‘s priority was to establish order instead of

empowerment; and with regard to the economic welfare of people, the elite, under the influence of western scholarship, implemented state-guided capitalist development instead of an equitable approach acceptable to all the communities and classes.

# Strong Institutions, Subservient Politicians, and Persistence of Old Social Structure

The ruling elite‘s preference for the establishment of order led to the concept of a strong state. However, broader rational-democratic discourse had set a new standard— democratic legitimacy. Hence, the elected parliament (the political class) was necessary to serve this purpose. In any case, the first Governor General and founder of Pakistan was a popular, charismatic leader and, therefore, was not much dependent upon politicians for legitimacy. Moreover, in Muslim majority areas, due to persistence of the feudal structure, democratic consciousness was limited while the mobilized segment of Mohajirs was already in accord with the elite‘s perceptions of internal and external ‗threats‘. Therefore, requirements of democratic legitimacy could be maintained without giving any increased role to the political class. Thus the state‘s institutions took precedence over the need for evolving a democratic culture and politicians were assigned a subservient role.

Politicians of high calibre, with mass support from Muslim majority areas who were at odds with AIML leadership, should have been accommodated in some way in order to develop a rational-democratic society. However, governing elite‘s priority for strong institutions necessitated to sideline

them as ‗disruptive elements‘.2 Therefore, politicians of low calibre, who were either docile or shared the authoritarian approach with the core elite, were patronized.3

Centralized bureaucratic control was established by discarding provincial cadres. Non-elected ex-bureaucrats were appointed as the governors of the provinces. The reports and advice of governors and bureaucrats were instrumental in governing the central and provincial governments.4 In fact, they proved to be the instruments of control of the central government over provincial cabinets, while the districts were already being managed by deputy commissioners, who were civil service officers controlled by a central authority. They were equipped with executive as well as judicial powers and directed the police, public works, health, education, in short every local administration department in the district. Indirect control of provincial and federal cabinets was further complemented by the induction of ex-bureaucrats in the federal cabinet.

After Jinnah, power shifted to the next ‗strong man‘, Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan. He took charge of bureaucratic control; and all the arbitrary powers of the position of Governor General, from then on, could only be used on his recommendations, in his favour. Though the prime minister was all powerful but he lacked the charisma which had insulated Jinnah from challenges to his authority by defiant politicians. Therefore, the PM‘s authority was enhanced by the passage of the Public Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act (PRODA) by the First Constituent Assembly in 1949 that further strengthened the authoritarian control of the central

government. Thus legal action could be taken against any defiant politician by labelling him/her as corrupt. Thus the need for strong institutions against ‗disruptive elements‘ militated against any possible reforms of these institutions. While the subservient role of politicians not only maintained but also reinvigorated factionalized politics. As a result, chances of the evolution of a democratic culture and the capacity to accommodate could not develop.

Though, democratic legitimacy could still be maintained without giving a greater share of power to the political elite, however, alienation of the political elite could lead to a legitimacy crisis. Hence the governing elite, that otherwise was interventionist, restrained itself from affecting the social positions and local interests of feudal lords through reforms. Besides, the ruling elite‘s approach to development was based on the assumption that the capitalist mode of production would automatically transform the feudal structure. Thus, the need for democratic legitimacy and belief in the capitalist mode of production hampered the chances of socio-economic reforms (land-reforms).5